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Secondly, the federal test, like that of Kentucky, has all but let the
witness invoke the privilege to any question automatically and, with-
out any statement as to why it was invoked, have it accepted by
the court. Even though this test provides greater protection, there
remains the fear that this privilege may be misused and the general
duty to testify when supoenaed will be greatly hampered.
Hunter Durham
CONSTrTIONAL LAw-PocE Pow v-"Trm IErucKY JuNKYARD Acr."
-Appellants, junk yard operators, instituted this action in the Frank-
lin Circuit Court seeking a declaration of rights and attacking the
constitutionality of Ky. Rev. Stat. 177.905-177.990, commonly known
as "The Junk Yard Act." The lower court upheld the act as a
valid exercise of the police power of the State, and not arbitrary,
discriminatory, nor unreasonable. Held: Affirmed. "The State may
constitutionally invoke its police power to regulate businesses where
the principal objective is based upon aesthetic considerations." Jasper
v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. 1964).
State regulation of trades and businesses under the police power
has been extended over the past fifty years to practically all forms
of business activity.' In the litigation thus produced by this extension,
the laws are attacked as violative of the due process of law clauses
of the federal constitution and various state constitutions.
The basic assumption of these attacks is that such regulation is
valid only when in the interest of public health, safety, or welfare,
and that where such a relationship between the regulation and the
interest of the public is lacking, the regulation becomes an uncon-
stitutional interference with the rights of the individual. As a practical
matter, the question of validity turns on the extent to which a court
will regard the legislative enactment as determinative or indicative
of the public interest supporting it.2
In Supreme Court cases, where the attack is based on the due
process and equal protection clauses, there is a broad presumption of
validity for state economic regulation through its police power.
However, where the basis for attack is racial discrimination, violation
of the first amendment, or undue restraint on interstate commerce,
no such far-reaching presumption supports the state regulation. In
I Dykstra, Legislative Favoritism Before the Courts 27 Ind. L.J. 38 (1951).2 Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process, 53
Nw. U.L. Rev. 13 (1958).
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these last three instances, the presumption is usually one of unconsti-
tutionality. In the due process area, the property interest of the at-
tacking party stands alone, unsupported by a constitutional policy
favoring freedom of enterprise analogous to policies found by the
Supreme Court in other areas.3 Where the Court once said, "nothing
is more settled than that it is beyond the power of the State under the
guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily to interfere with private
business ... or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions...."4
it now says, "the concept of public welfare is broad and inclusive...
the values it represents are aesthetic as well as monetary . . . it is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community
should be beautiful as well as healthy . . . and nothing in the Fifth
Amendment stands in the way."5
The new attitude of the Supreme Court is thus seen: an enlarged
recognition of social interdependence and the legitimate sphere of
legislative experiment. No longer must states bring their legislative
enactments under the conventional heads of health, safety, and
welfare.6
In analyzing the Kentucky Court's decision in the Jasper case, one
looks for traditional justifications, that junk yards are unsafe, un-
sanitary, or offend the public morals, but one looks in vain. The court
of appeals has made little attempt to place this decision on any of the
traditional grounds. The court says that while there may be safety
interests involved, aesthetic considerations are the principal bases
for the statute, and holds that such considerations justify exercise
of the police power.
Although not a complete departure from previous decisions, neither
is the Jasper decision an affirmation of Kentucky case law on the
subject of business regulation under the police power. It is more in
the nature of an extension-an unwarranted extension-of the digni-
fied and respected doctrine of police power of the government. The
court of appeals has always been careful to base decisions on tan-
gible areas of public welfare, but today it approves regulation of one's
business when that business offends another's sense of beauty. The
court cites Turner v. Peters,7 a 1959 Kentucky case, as precedent for
legislative control of businesses which offend the aesthetics of the
community. The court fails to point out that the Turner case, in fact,
held an ordinance unconstitutional for lack of expressed standards.
3 Id. at 229.
4 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932).
5 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
6 Berman, TA.zs ON AMiUcAN LAw 81 (1961).
7 327 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1959).
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While the Turner case did mention, by dicta, that there could be a
legitimate public interest in businesses which offend the community's
aesthetics, the court hastened to point out that the junk business has
a potential danger to public peace, safety, and health-the tradi-
tional justifications for use of police power. It is urged that the Turner
case affords no authority for the step taken by the court in the jasper
case.
For federal support the court of appeals relies on Berman v.
Parker,8 a 1954 Supreme Court decision involving urban renewal in
Washington, D.C. Although the Supreme Court held the use of police
power for condemnation to be constitutional in that particular in-
stance, the Berman case is not authority for the Jasper decision. In
Berman, compensation was awarded the property owners, all classes
of business were equally affected, and zoning laws were involved.
In Jasper, there was and -ill be no compensation to these junk yard
owners, the Kentucky statute does not affect all businesses equally,
and most junk yards in the state are located outside the areas affected
by zoning laws.
While the general intention of the legislature and the court of
appeals may be good, this does not justify the use of unreasonable
means to achieve that intention. Moreover, there are many questions
unanswered by the court and not decided by the Jasper case. Does
this constitute denial of equal protection of laws, since only junk
yards are regulated, while coal tipples and saw mills, to name only a
few, are not included? Are aesthetics alone adequate justification for
legislation of this tenor in an economic climate so desperately needing
new industry as Kentucky? Does legislation of this type constitute
an unreasonable restraint on the interstate flow of scrap iron? Clari-
fication on these and many other points is badly needed.
The Jasper decision could and undoubtedly will pave the way for
more legislative enactments that had been beyond the scope of the
police power of the state. The question of urban renewal could now
be entirely out of the hands of the people affected, and once it is
found to be "aesthetically desirable," it would be done. The ultimate
impact of this decision may not be seen for many years, too late to
remedy the situation.
The statute is discriminatory in its result. Junk yards must be
screened while saw mills and stone quarries need not be hidden.
Stockyards and coal tipples may offend the eye of the travelling public,
but junk yards must be hidden from view. Moreover, the statute dis-
criminates against the small operator, whose inventory of six cars
8348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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requires him to build an expensive fence or sell out. At this point, it is
urged that in this age of planned obsolescence by automotive manu-
facturers, junk yards perform a service indispensible to the public.
Why burden either the small junkman or the large operator with
such unreasonable restrictions? We are told it is for aesthetic ob-
jectives alone.
May a business or a class of businesses be arbitrarily declared to
be a public nuisance, as a matter of law, when in fact not a nuisance?
Michigan9 and Ohio10 courts say no.
The punitive hand of this statute falls too heavily. The statute
provides: "and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not
less than one hundred dollars and not more than one thousand
dollars. Each day of violation of the provisions of KRS 177.905 to KRS
177.950 shall constitute a separate offense." 1 (Emphasis added.) It is
submitted that this expressly violates section 17 of the Constitution of
Kentucky and amendment eight of the Constitution of the United
States, which provide that excessive fines shall not be imposed. It was
urged by counsel for the state that these provisions were necessary to
put teeth into the statute.'2 "Teeth" is grossly inadequate to describe a
1,000 dollar a day penalty for offending such a nebulous concept
as "beauty." It is submitted that the criminal penalties are much too
excessive and are violative of the Kentucky and the United States
Constitutions.
Reasonable regulation in many areas is not only desirable, but
necessary. We must not confine ourselves to regulating one class of
business while allowing others, more ugly and more dangerous than
junk yards, to operate openly and without regulation. We cannot
allow regulation to become confiscatory, nor should the regulation
bear more heavily than conditions require, for this is when regulation
becomes unreasonable and unconstitutional.
Harry M. Snyder Jr.
TORT-MuNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY DocrRaNE.-A seven-year-old child
drowned in a municipal swimming pool. The administratrix of her
estate filed suit against the City of Lexington, Kentucky, alleging that
the child's death was caused by the negligent operation of the pool by
9 Bzovi v. City of Livonia, 850 Mich. 489, 87 N.W.2d 110 (1957).
10 City of Washington v. Thompson, 160 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1949).
1LKy. Rev. Stat. § 177.990(3) (1962).
1 2 Brief for Appellee, p. 21, Jasper v. Commonwealth, 375 S.W.2d 735 (Ky.
1964).
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